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PRIVATE FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS IN THE EU 
 
Tetty Havinga* 
 
Abstract 
The global system of food regulation has grown into a complex arrangement 
of various laws and standards on different governmental levels. These laws 
and standards are increasingly of a transnational nature. Currently most food 
laws within the Members States of the European Union are based on EU law. 
Next to governments private actors also increasingly engage in food regula-
tion. In particular, corporate retailers and multinational food manufacturers 
have initiated and promoted private food safety standards. The structure of 
private standards and the complex relationship of these private standards with 
governmental legislation in the EU is the subject of this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
In the first section of this paper I describe the proliferation of private 
standards with a focus on the dominant transnational standards recog-
nized by the Global Food Safety Initiative. In the next sections I analyse 
what the relationships between the private and the public regulations 
look like. I do so with regard to four regulatory functions: rule-making, 
adoption, monitoring and review. Section 2.1 deals with rule-making 
and analyses how public actors participate in the setting of private rules 
and how private actors participate in decision-making on public rules. 
Section 2.2 analyses whether public and private regulators adopted 
each other’s standards and provides some examples of incorporation 
of private rules in EU law and incorporation of EU law in private stand-
ards. Section 2.3 deals with monitoring compliance. Do governmental 
inspectors take private certificates into account? And to what extent 
do private auditors check compliance with public rules? And what are 
the subjects of discussion here? Section 2.4 deals with an evaluation 
and review of the food regulations. Do private standards incorporate 
criticism from public authorities in reviewing the standards? Are EU insti-
tutions open to criticism and proposals from private standard organiza-
tions? Section 3 concludes. 
                                            
*  Tetty Havinga is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law of the Radboud Univer-
siteit Nijmegen, The Netherlands. She thanks Paul Verbruggen and Frans van 
Waarden for sharing their ideas on private food standards with me. 
 This paper will be published, in: Harry Bremmers and Kai Purnhagen (eds.) Regu-
lating Food Safety Law in the EU. A Management and Economics Perspective. 
Berlin: Springer, forthcoming 2017. 
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1.1 Characteristics of private food standards 
Development of private standards 
It is well documented that private standards have become increasingly 
important in food safety governance (as well as in other domains) over 
the last 25 years (e.g. Bain, Ransom & Higgins 2013; Busch & Bingen 2006; 
Henson & Humphrey 2009; Van der Meulen 2011a). The use of private 
standards has become very common in many branches of the food 
industry in many European countries. Moreover, private standards did 
pioneering work in the modernisation of food regulation. For these rea-
sons an analysis of food safety regulation in the EU cannot be limited to 
public laws and should include private standards as well. 
Several circumstances made up a fertile ground for the rise of pri-
vate food standards. The increasing globalization of food supply chains 
makes it more difficult for both food industry and national governments 
to safeguard the safety of food products. Food supply chains encom-
pass places of production and trading around the globe, some sites 
and processes may disappear from sight. Retailers and manufacturers 
sourcing globally sought ways to keep in control (Hatanaka et al. 2005; 
Henson & Humphry 2010; Oosterveer 2005). National governments also 
face a problem here because their jurisdiction is locked inside their na-
tional territory. Secondly, the increased economic power of supermar-
ket chains also contributed to the rise of private food standards (Burch 
& Lawrence 2005; Marsden 2010). Concentration in the food retail sec-
tor was the result of expansion and mergers. Several corporate food re-
tailers operate in many countries and have a powerful market position 
(Fuchs et al. 2009; Ten Kate & Van der Wal 2017; Marden 2010, 156ff). A 
third development that contributed to the rise of private food standards 
is the growing public concern about food safety as a result of several 
food scandals (BSE, dioxin, E-coli, salmonella) (Ansell & Vogel 2006; 
Fulponi 2006; Henson &Humphry 2010; Van der Kloet 2011). The food in-
dustry undertook all kinds of initiatives in order to restore and keep con-
sumer trust in food. The fourth factor that has contributed to the rise of 
private food regulation is the perception of insufficient governmental 
regulation. The governmental response to food incidents such as the 
BSE crisis has been perceived as inadequate by both consumers’ or-
ganizations and food industry (Bernauer & Caduff 2006; Henson 2011; 
Vos 2000). Criticism of the regulatory capacity of governments is not 
limited to the domain of food regulation. The capacity of governments 
to regulate markets has been criticized for being ineffective, inade-
quate and outdated (Baldwin, Cave & Lodge 2012, 68ff; Majone 1994). 
These factors constitute the context in which private food standards de-
veloped and flourish. 
The rise of private food safety standards started in the 1990s. How-
ever, private standards are not entirely new in the food industry (Busch 
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& Bingen 2016). The food sector has a long history of quality controls by 
manufacturers, trade associations, and corporatist organizations, par-
ticularly in the production and trading of perishable food (milk, meat) 
(Van Waarden 1985). Systems of certification of producers, manufac-
turers, traders, controlling laboratories and products are common. Clas-
sic examples include kosher supervision and the French wine appella-
tions (Lytton 2013; Moran 1993). The new generation of private food 
standards differs from historical examples in several ways. The typical 
current food standard operates with a written normative document 
specifying the substantive and procedural norms and the modes of ver-
ification of compliance with these norms, is international in scope, re-
quires third party certification, covers a wide range of issues and is man-
aged by a special organisation with formalized procedures for review-
ing the standard, auditing, certification, and handling of complaints. 
Older private food standards were often less formalised, focussing on a 
single issue and a local market, and often verification and enforcement 
procedures were absent or less elaborated (Fouilleux & Loconto 2017, 
5-6).1 
 
Characteristics of private standards 
What is a private standard? A private standard is a set of rules or norms 
developed by private actors, such as food manufacturers, non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs), industry associations, farmers, retailers 
and food service providers. These norms set minimum requirements for 
products, processes or producers. Some examples may clarify this. Sev-
eral animal welfare organisations set up an animal welfare scheme to 
encourage firms to improve animal welfare and to enable consumers 
to vote with their feet by choosing products with an animal welfare la-
bel. Examples include ‘Freedom Food’, a British farm assurance and 
food labelling scheme set up by the Royal Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals, ‘Neuland’, a German animal welfare labelling 
scheme founded in 1988 by a farmer union and two animal welfare or-
ganisations, and ‘Bioland’, a private food quality scheme open for par-
ticipation of agricultural and livestock producers and food processors 
(Food Chain Evaluation Consortium 2009). The ‘Bioland’ label illustrates 
that private standards are not always clearly separated from public 
standards. The Bioland guidelines are developed by organic producer 
groups in compliance with Council Regulation (EEC) 2092/91 of 24 June 
1991 on organic production of agricultural products and indications re-
ferring thereto on agricultural products and foodstuffs (later replaced 
                                            
1  See for example Fouilleux & Loconto (2017, 5-6) who discuss the shift from com-
munity-shared value-oriented principles of organic farming to globalized audita-
ble standards. 
Havinga: Private Food Safety Standards in the EU 
6 
by Regulation (EC) 834/2007). The Bioland guidelines for production ex-
ceed the EU minimum requirements for organic produce. 
The concept of private scheme usually refers to a private standard 
and its internal governance structure and procedures for conformity as-
sessment and enforcement. Thus a scheme consists of not just the sub-
stantial norms and requirements (standard) but includes also a man-
agement structure and auditing protocol. 
Public and private responsibilities for food governance often are not 
neatly delineated (Havinga 2006; Henson & Humphrey 2010). ‘Private 
food standards [...] are better understood as part of a governance 
structure rather than as governmental strategies outside the state’ 
(Lockie et al. 2013, 289) The decisive factor for characterizing a stand-
ard as a private, public or hybrid standard is who decides on the rules. 
Animal welfare standards developed by NGOs, by farmer organisa-
tions, by fast food chains and combinations between those types of or-
ganisations are private standards. Animal welfare provisions in EU or na-
tional state laws or guidelines are public standards. 
Private food standards cover a wide range of issues (see for multiple 
examples of private food standards Hammoudi et al. 2015, Henson & 
Humphrey 2009, Van der Meulen 2011a, Wright et al. 2013). Major trans-
national standards such as the British Retail Consortium Global Standard 
for Food Safety (BRC), the International Featured Standards Food Stand-
ard (IFS), Food Safety System Certification 22000 (FSSC) and Glob-
alG.A.P. Integrated Farm Assurance Standard have a strong focus on 
food safety (Havinga 2015a). Other standards include quality require-
ments and credence attributes related to environmental and social in-
terests. Certification may entail compliance with standards related to 
sustainability (e.g. Marine Stewardship Council, Rainforest Alliance), fair 
trading (e.g. Max Havelaar, UTZ), biodynamic agriculture (e.g. Deme-
ter), organic production (e.g. KRAV, Bioland), religious food laws (e.g. 
Kashrut Division of the London Beth Din for Kosher Certification, the Halal 
Authority Board Standard), vegetarian food (e.g. Vegan) and require-
ments for a healthy diet (e.g. the Heart-Check mark from the American 
Heart Association). Some standards cover a broad range of issues while 
others just concentrate on one single issue.  
Standards also differ in their geographical reach, some standards 
are applied globally (BRC, GlobalG.A.P.) while others are limited to a 
small local area. Another distinction is that between company food 
standards and industry-wide standards (Henson & Humphrey 2011,153-
154). Some food companies established their own company food 
standard that has to be applied by all companies in their supply chain. 
The origin of several food standards is an individual downstream com-
pany imposing demands on their upstream suppliers in order to prevent 
risks and damages (e.g. incidents, recalls, liability claims, reputation 
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damage). There is a thin line between product requirements specified 
in a supply contract and arranging these requirements in a company 
standard. An example of a company standard is the ‘Albert Heijn 
Quality Assurance’, which has been abolished and replaced by in-
dustry-wide standards (first BRC and later all GFSI-recognized standards) 
(Havinga 2006). Another example of a company standard is Tesco 
Nurture, an exclusive independently accredited scheme to ensure that 
fruit and vegetables are grown according to environmental and 
responsible standards.2  
Private standards fulfil two basic functions in the market (Henson & 
Humphrey 2010, 1639). The first main function is risk management. In this 
case private standards are used to set a minimum level of quality, safety 
or whatever it is that is regulated by the standard. This is a form of ex 
ante regulation (in contrast to ex post forms of regulation such as liability 
law, recall, breach of contract litigation). Setting a minimum level is the 
main objective of food safety standards such as BRC or GlobalG.A.P. 
Compliance with this type of standards is often not communicated to 
the public, these are so-called business-to-business (B2B) standards. 
Certification is a condition for entering the market, usually no price pre-
mium is included.  
On the other hand, a second category of standards is expressly 
meant to differentiate products or producers meeting the standard 
from other products available on the market. These standards want to 
signify added value, premium high quality or some special attributes. 
Compliance with this type of standards is usually signalled to consumers 
by a label or trade mark. These are business-to-consumer standards 
(B2C). Certification may enable the access to higher values markets 
and/or higher prices. Examples include certification against the Marine 
Stewardship Council standard for sustainable fish, kosher food stand-
ards, animal welfare and fair trade standards. These standards offer 
buyers a choice and try to seduce buyers to show a preference for 
products or producers in compliance with the B2C standard.  
In course of time the character of a standard may change. Starting 
as a distinguishing standard it may develop into a minimum standard at 
the moment that almost all products or producers are in compliance 
with the standard. This development may be strived for, as is often the 
case for programs aiming to promote sustainability, fair trade or animal 
welfare. In other cases, it seems to be the result of the diffusion process 
of a new standard: starting small in the start-up phase and growing 
thereafter. GlobalG.A.P. is an example in case. In the early years farm-
ers who were certified against this standard (called EurepGap at the 
time) were particularly proud of this distinguishing performance, 
                                            
2  http://www.tesco.com/nurture/?page=nurturescheme.  
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whereas today almost all farmers in Western European countries such 
as the Netherlands and Germany need to be GlobalG.A.P. certified (as 
the market for non-GlobalG.A.P. certified vegetables and fruits is very 
limited) and GlobalG.A.P. certification has lost its distinguishing value in 
these markets. From the very start the EurepGap/GlobalG.A.P. has 
been a business-to-business standard; in the early years it was not al-
lowed to communicate certification to consumers, currently consumers 
can verify whether the products they buy are GlobalG.A.P. certified by 
entering a number on the website.3 The retailers that initiated the Eurep-
Gap standard did aim at a minimum standard from the very start in or-
der to realize consumer confidence in the safety of all vegetables and 
fruits in their supermarket stores and an extensive supply of vegetables 
and fruits fulfilling their requirements creating many buyer options. 
Both in the literature and in public debates private standards are 
occasionally referred to as self-regulation. But are private standards a 
form of self-regulation? Most private food standards are not to be con-
sidered pure self-regulation. In self-regulation the regulator is also the 
regulate (Levi-Faur 2011, 8). Most of the private food standards are not 
initiated nor developed by the same people to whom the rules apply, 
in other words the regulator is not identical to the regulatee: retailers 
developed standards for farmers and food manufacturers (Global-
G.A.P., BRC), an environmental organisation together with a food man-
ufacturer developed a standard for fisheries (MSC), and a food outlet 
developed a standard for farmers (Starbucks Shared Planet).  
Most private standards are voluntary standards: compliance with 
the standard is not laid down by law. However, quite often the regu-
latee (food business) is under contract to comply with the standard. So 
without being legally mandatory, adoption of these ‘voluntary’ stand-
ards often is a contractual obligation and economically bound (Ca-
faggi & Iamiceli 2015; Clapp 2016, 125; Havinga 2015a). Regulatees 
might be forced by the market to adhere to the voluntary standard. In 
particular the large corporate retailers and multinational food manu-
facturers use their economic power to require certification against pri-
vate food standards from their suppliers. Thus, 96% of the suppliers of 
own brand food products in Ahold supermarkets across Europe is certi-
fied against GFSI recognized standards (Ahold 2016, 8). 
Although most private food standards are voluntary and most pub-
lic standards are mandatory, this is not by definition the case. Henson & 
Humphrey (2010, 1630) distinguish between four possible combinations 
of public/private and mandatory/voluntary food standards:  
                                            
3  http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/for-consumers/, accessed 1-4-2016. 
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2017/01 
9 
-  public mandatory standards (regulations and laws such as the EU 
General Food Law and the German Lebensmittel- und Futtermit-
telgesetzbuch),  
-  public voluntary standards created by public bodies but whose 
adoption is voluntary (examples include Label Rouge in France, or-
ganic food labels, Codex Alimentarius standards, national HACCP 
(Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) standards such as DS 
3027 and ELOT 1416) (see with regard to organic food: Arcuri 2015; 
Schmidt 2011, 290, 293; Henson & Humphrey 2010, 1630, refer to La-
bel Rouge; Canadian FSEP is a voluntary HACCP program: Herath & 
Henson 2006), 
-  legally mandated private standards that have been developed by 
private organisations and made mandatory by public bodies, and 
finally,  
-  voluntary private standards developed and adopted by private 
bodies, not legal mandatory (e.g. BRC, IFS and GlobalG.A.P.).  
 
I am not acquainted with a clear-cut example of a legally mandated 
private food standard. However, examples that come close include 
laws on organically produced food in the European Union and the 
United States, inclusion of HACCP provisions in Codex and EU law, a def-
inition of fair trade in French law, and Swiss Federal law on Good agri-
cultural practices (see for organic food: Arcuri 2015; Boström & Klintman 
2006; Schmidt 2011; for HACCP: Bernauer & Caduff 2006; Demortain 
2007; for fair trade in French law and GAP in Switzerland: FAO 2014). In 
all these cases standards that had been developed by private organi-
sations were included in national or federal laws. Adoption of the stand-
ard remained voluntary (organic, fair trade) or became mandatory 
(HACCP). This chapter deals with the private standards (the last two cat-
egories) and in particular with major transnational food safety stand-
ards. As already stated, some of the not legally mandated private 
standards are de facto obligatory for access to important markets.  
The status of a standard may change as the following two examples 
will show. Since 2003, the Safe Quality Food standard (SQF) is a US pri-
vate retail-driven standard. However, SQF started as a public voluntary 
standard and was transformed into a private voluntary standard when 
the ownership of the standard changed: the Food Marketing Institute 
acquired the standard in 2003 from the West-Australian Department of 
Agriculture. The opposite happened with private standards for organic 
agriculture that had been developed by farmers’ and consumers’ or-
ganisations in many European countries. From completely private 
standards they have been transformed into public minimum standards. 
European Union regulations allow for additional requirements from pri-
vate organic standards, whereas this is excluded in US regulations. As 
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Arcuri concludes this shows ‘the analytical difficulties of studying the in-
teraction between public and private regulation in terms of binary think-
ing’ (Arcuri 2015, 15). The influence of governmental intervention on pri-
vate regulatory schemes is not always either supportive or limiting but 
can also be both supportive and constraining. 
1.2  Major transnational private food standards and third party 
certification 
The remainder of this chapter is focussed on transnational food safety 
standards that dominate the European market. In particular retail-
driven standards are very important because many suppliers of the 
large multinational supermarkets are required to be certified against 
one of these standards. Mergers and concentration in the retail market 
resulted in a relatively small number of multinational supermarket chains 
with large economic power in global and domestic food supply chains 
(Fuchs et al. 2009; Ten Kate & Van der Wal 2017). Moreover, retail eco-
nomic power is increased through cooperation in international buying 
groups. In Western European countries these multinational supermarkets 
have a large majority share of the food consumers’ market. Important 
retail-driven private standards in Europe include the BRC Global Stan-
dard for Food Safety, the IFS Food Standard and the GlobalG.A.P.. 
These standards have been adopted by retailers associations from the 
UK, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands and are a supplier 
requirement of many supermarkets and food businesses around the 
world. A transnational food safety standard supported by multinational 
food manufacturers is the Food Safety System Certification 22000 
(FSSC).4 Together these four transnational standards issued more than 
200,000 certificates.5 These standards are benchmarked by the Global 
Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). The GFSI is an industry-driven initiative pro-
viding guidance on food safety management systems and a global 
platform for communication to improve food safety (see on GFSI 
Fagotto 2017; Havinga & Verbruggen 2017; Verbruggen & Havinga 
2016). GFSI is set up and run by representatives of some of the powerful 
global retailers and food manufacturers.  
The process of globalization of retail-driven food safety standards for 
suppliers follows the pattern of bottom-up globalization of regulation. In 
the 1990s some retail companies changed their practice and devel-
oped a company food standard in response to food safety incidents 
and diminishing consumer trust. Others model this new practice and in 
the end this results in globalization of the new standard of practice. As 
                                            
4  See for a more detailed description of these standards, their development and 
dissemination Havinga 2015a. 
5  Figures on the website of the standards at 23-11-2016: BRC 23,000; FSSC 13,685; 
GlobalG.A.P. 140.000; IFS 16,800. 
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Braithwaite &Drahos point out ‘rather than business practice following 
from norms and rules, often mechanisms of modelling delivers globali-
zation of practice which is subsequently codified in rules’ (Braithwaite & 
Drahos 2000, 554). Initially the collective food standards were national 
standards (BRC in UK, IFS in Germany). Since they have expanded four-
fold (Havinga 2015a, 61-63). 1) Geographically, the standard was 
adopted by supermarkets’ chains in other countries. 2) Scope of the 
standard is no longer limited to own brand food products. 3) Scope be-
yond food, the organisations also developed standards for non-food, 
for packaging and for storage and distribution. 4) In due time other 
groups than the initial members gained access to technical committees 
and meetings and in some cases to the board of the standard organi-
sation. This includes retailers from other countries, but also food manu-
facturers and certification bodies. Despite the growing openness, con-
sumer groups and other NGOs are hardly participating in the decision-
making process of any of these standards organisations. GlobalG.A.P. is 
the most open, BRC the most closed club. 
These private standards are generally organized along the following 
lines. There is a standard-owner, that is a retailers’ organisation or a new 
for-profit or not-for-profit organisation established to manage the stand-
ard. The standard-owner decides on the general regulations and man-
agement structure of the standard organisation. The standard-owner is 
also responsible for appointing the Board. The Board is responsible for 
major decisions on the standard such as provisions in the normative 
document, regular procedures for revising the standard document and 
appointing members of technical committees and working groups. Usu-
ally a technical committee or working group is responsible for the con-
tent of the standard, the review process and training programs for au-
ditors. Often consultation rounds for all stakeholders are organized and 
some standards run special programs to assist small food businesses in 
particularly in developing countries. 
Food businesses that are found in compliance with the standard are 
certified. Verification of compliance is delegated to certification bod-
ies, organisations specialized in auditing and verifying compliance. 
Most standards only accept certification bodies that are accredited by 
a national accreditation body. Some standards accept certification by 
all accredited certification bodies whereas other standards only ac-
cept particular selected certification bodies. 
A food business that wants to get a food safety certificate has to 
decide for a standard and then hire a certification body that will audit 
to verify that the firm is working in compliance with the regulations in the 
standard. Some standards have grades (such as one, two or three stars; 
level A or B), others only differentiate between compliant or not. After 
a successful auditing process the firm gets a certificate. After some 
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months (often 6 or 12) a new audit visit is required to verify continued 
compliance. Many standards do not require unannounced inspections. 
However this is changing. Several standards have recently introduced 
(optional) unannounced audit visits to refute criticism of inadequate 
controls.6 Food businesses have to pay for the auditing and certification 
services. This situation constitutes a conflict of interest between the au-
ditor’s financial interest in keeping the customer satisfied and its profes-
sional obligation to protect the public against food safety risks (Lytton & 
McAllister 2014). 
Next to the major transnational food safety standards discussed 
above, several standards exist in local markets or with a focus on special 
commodities, particularly for primary produce. Examples include the 
Global Red Meat Standard and the Global Aquaculture Alliance Sea-
food; these standards are owned by industry associations and GFSI 
benchmarked. Other standards developed by industry associations in-
clude the German ‘Qualität und Sicherheit’, the Dutch ‘IKB’ and the 
British ‘Little Red Tractor’. National standardization organizations in for 
example Denmark, France, Spain have developed national standards; 
in these countries the national standardization organizations are private 
not for profit associations mandated by the government (Canivet 2006, 
16-17).7 A 2010 inventory of certification schemes for agricultural prod-
ucts and foodstuffs marketed in the EU Member States found 441 (sub-) 
schemes.8 Particularly in Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom 
many schemes were developed (Aréte 2010, 3). 
Private food safety standards cover different products and pro-
cesses in the food supply chain, from farming (animals, plants, fish, 
grains), processing, storage and distribution, packaging to catering and 
retail. Private food safety standards generally include requirements re-
lated to a HACCP food safety management system, resource manage-
ment, training and education of personnel, responsibilities of senior 
management, process control, inspection and testing, labelling, pack-
aging, traceability, protective clothing and personnel hygiene, build-
ings and pest control. Recently some standards also included require-
ments on food fraud prevention and authenticity control. 
  
                                            
6  The 2017 edition of the GFSI Guidelines requires food safety schemes to ensure 
that unannounced audits are available as a preferred option (art. 2.5.5, GFSI 
Benchmarking requirements, GFSI Guidance document version7).  
7  E.g. Standards DS 3027, Agriconfiance, UNE 155000. Food safety standards are 
also developed by the national standardization organizations in Greece, Ireland 
and Italy (e.g. ELOT 1416, IS 343, UNI 10854); these organizations are mandated by 
the government or part of the government, so this are public voluntary standards. 
8  http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/certification/index_en.htm.  
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Figure: System of accredited third party certification of GFSI recognised 
food safety schemes 
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2.  Relations between public and private actors 
After the introduction of some of the widely used private food stand-
ards, we will now turn to our main question: how do private standards 
work: what do they do, who is involved and why. We will also investigate 
the relationships between the private and the public governance ar-
rangements. Subsequently we discuss the questions for four phases in 
the regulatory process: rule-making, adopting, monitoring and enforce-
ment, and review. This section deals with rule-making. 
Setting of private standards usually involves three parties: a tech-
nical committee preparing the draft standard, a board deciding on the 
standard and in most cases stakeholders. Members of technical com-
mittees are experts from the membership of the standard-owner’s or-
ganisation or from different stakeholders and academics. Standards dif-
fer in the openness and transparency of the standard setting process. 
Currently many standards have public consultation rounds or stakehold-
ers’ meetings to get input for the standard and to create sufficient sup-
port. The owner of a private standard appoints the members of the 
board. The board has the final say in the content of the standard. Sev-
eral major transnational food safety standards are owned by retailers’ 
associations (the management may be either by the retail association 
or – more common – by an organisation specially established by the 
retailers’ association to manage the standard). 
Many standards started with just a few founding members and 
gradually included more people in the process of standard setting, ei-
ther by increased membership or by including participants from various 
stakeholders in a non-membership organisation. Major food safety 
standards such as IFS and BRC show this development. Participants in-
clude retailers, manufacturers, primary producers, certification bodies, 
and academics. Consumer representatives and other non-governmen-
tal organisations are hardly participating in the standard setting process 
of major food safety standards (Fuchs et al. 2011). The active participa-
tion of NGOs is one of the important differences with B2C food stand-
ards focussing on social and moral issues. Some of these B2C standards 
are initiated and managed by NGOs pursuing interests such as animal 
welfare, ethical trading, or sustainability. The first edition of these stand-
ards often is drafted by the NGOs.  
What is the relation between private standards and public regula-
tion? There are two sides to this question:  
1) How do public actors participate in the setting of private standards 
and schemes?  
2) What is the relation between the requirements set in the private 
standard and legal requirements? 
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Julia Black (1998, 124) distinguishes four forms of self-regulation with a 
different role of the state that can also be applied to private food stand-
ards:  
1. mandated private regulation: an industry or profession is formally or 
informally required by the government to formulate and enforce 
norms within a broad framework defined by the government; 
2. sanctioned private regulation: an industry formulates a regulation 
and subjects it to government approval; 
3. coerced private regulation: the industry formulates and enforces 
the regulation in response to threats of statutory regulation; 
4. voluntary private regulation without any state involvement in pro-
moting or mandating the regulation. 
 
The development of retail-driven private food safety standards such as 
BRC and IFS is a clear example of the last, voluntary private regulation. 
Large supermarket companies initiated this without state involvement 
and without the threat of statutory regulation. On the contrary, one of 
the drivers is the perception that governmental food regulation was in-
adequate and consumer confidence in food had to be reinstalled after 
several food safety incidents. However, the introduction of new liability 
legislation has contributed to the rise of private standards. Although 
these retail standards are developed without any state interference, 
they are nevertheless connected to (failing and new) statutory provi-
sions. The government may be involved in some voluntary standards, 
creating a more mixed form. Consider the participation of governmen-
tal technical experts in private standard setting. The Dutch food safety 
authority (Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit – NVWA), for exam-
ple, participated in the development of Dutch HACCP and Riskplaza 
(Verbruggen 2014, 239ff). 
Private standards always operate within a legal framework. This le-
gal framework consists of general provisions from contract law, tax law, 
corporate law and liability law and more specific legal provisions that 
both enable and constrain the development and management of pri-
vate standards. Marsden, Flynn &Harrison concluded from their analysis 
of the British food regulatory system, that ‘it is the corporate retailers who 
have led the way (…) also in how to regulate food quality under in-
creasingly complex and competitive food supply conditions’ (Marsden, 
Flynn & Harrison 2000, 193) From the mid-1980s till 2000 this dominance 
of large retailers leaves ‘the State mainly as auditors rather than stand-
ard-setters and enforcers of the mainstream process’ (Marsden et al. 
2010, 284). Moreover, most private food safety standards are built upon 
public standards such as Codex and ISO standards, and EU law (see for 
example Casey 2017 on GlobalG.A.P., and Henson & Humphrey 2011 
on the relation between private standards and Codex). A key element 
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of private food safety standards is the practical translation of statutory 
requirements. Private standards lay down more specific and detailed 
instructions as to how to comply with legal requirements. Henson 
&Humphrey argue this is the most important function of private stand-
ards in the area of food safety (Henson & Humphrey 2011, 160). Private 
standards not only add detailed specifications to public regulation, 
many standards also set stricter requirements. They can do so by adding 
requirements on issues not covered by governmental regulation, by set-
ting lower thresholds or by extending existing requirements.9 It is partic-
ularly this characteristic of private food standards that has been con-
tested by developing countries, international organizations such as the 
FAO and SME representatives for causing trade barriers (see Henson & 
Humphry 2010, 2011; Havinga & Verbruggen 2017, 196-197). 
The EU General Food Law stipulates that food business operators 
carry primary responsibility for the safety of the food they produce or 
sell. Each business is responsible for taking the measures necessary to 
ensure compliance with food law requirements within the context of its 
own specific activities by applying verification procedures and quality 
assurance systems. Food business operators, except primary producers, 
are required to put in place and implement procedures based on 
HACCP principles.10 This legal requirement reinforced the growth of pri-
vate food certification schemes as compliance with a private standard 
helps a food business to comply with the legal requirements because 
the private standards require a food safety management system based 
on HACCP principles. In fact, the legal requirement to maintain a 
HACCP food safety plan in place is an example of governmental rule-
making using the experience of private companies, private standards 
and certification. National, European and US governments draw upon 
the experience of private food standard organizations and auditors 
with HACCP and included a mandatory HACCP plan in new food laws 
(Marsden 2010, 255; Oldfield 2015). This tended to empower the retailer-
led forms of food regulation (Marsden 2010, 103). The moment national 
or transnational governments (such as the EU, US and Canadian gov-
ernment) made a HACCP food safety management system legally 
mandatory for (part of) the food industry, they incorporated the norms 
in the law (Marsden 2010, 255).11  
                                            
9  See for example Wright et al. 2013, who assessed many private food assurance 
schemes operating in the UK and give an overview of correspondence of scheme 
requirements with legislative requirements regarding food hygiene and safety. 
10  Art. 5 of Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 on food hygiene. 
11  During the 1990s leading multinational food industries voluntarily adopted food 
safety management plans based on the principles of HACCP. Food quality sys-
tems of major retailers required HACCP from their suppliers. The large retailers 
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Another example of complex interactions between private and 
public actors in setting food safety standards is the development of in-
dustry guides to good practice for hygiene and for the application of 
HACCP principles. One of the major obligations on food business oper-
ators in EU law is that they have to ‘put in place, implement and main-
tain a permanent procedure based on Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) principles’.12 This requirement is a form of en-
forced self-regulation (Braithwaite 1982) or mandated private regula-
tion (Black 1998): food business operators are legally obliged to develop 
a risk management system. The option to develop industry guides to 
good hygienic practice was included in the law particularly to help 
small and medium (SME) sized food business operators to comply with 
this legal requirement. The guide has to be developed by a sector of 
the food industry or a national standards institute and approved by the 
government (Havinga 2014; Van der Meulen 2017). These hygiene 
guides are a form of what Black has called sanctioned private regula-
tion. 
The General Food Law of the European Union is committed to the 
involvement of stakeholder organizations in the regulatory process. 
Representatives of consumers, industry, retailers and farmers are con-
sulted and informed by the Commission and EFSA (Vos &Wendler 2006, 
90, 124-126). Formal consultations take place in the context of the Ad-
visory Group on the Food Chain and Animal Health. The Advisory Group 
has 45 members representing European associations of consumers, 
farmers, food industry and retailers.13 EFSA established a Consultative 
Stakeholder Platform and organizes public hearings. The participation 
of industry, retail and farmers in rule-making and risk assessment is not 
undisputed as it may harm independent decision-making. 
The European Commission developed guidelines for certification 
scheme developers and operators to help improve ‘the transparency, 
credibility and effectiveness of voluntary certification schemes and en-
suring that they do not conflict with regulatory requirements.’14 The 
guidelines include recommendations regarding scheme participation 
and development, scheme requirements and claims, certification and 
inspections and mutual recognition and overlap with other schemes. 
                                            
were lobbying for making the operation of a HACCP food management system 
mandatory by law.  
12  Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the hygiene of foodstuffs. HACCP stands for Hazard Analysis and Crit-
ical Control Point. 
13  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_food-safety/dgs_consultations/advisory_group_ 
en.htm.  
14  Commission Communication ‘EU best practice guidelines for voluntary certifica-
tion schemes for Agricultural products and foodstuffs’, 2010/C 341/04, 1.2.  
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The recommendations aim at the participation of all possible stakehold-
ers, transparency and free availability of information (including disclo-
sure of fees and providing translations), independent and effective in-
spections and appropriate sanctions and the avoidance of high costs 
for food operators. Adherence to these guidelines is voluntary. The de-
velopment of these guidelines is an attempt of the European Commis-
sion to stay in control and to influence developments in the domain of 
private food governance.  
2.2  Adoption 
After a standard is set, the standard has to be adopted by food business 
operators and other stakeholders. Whereas many statutory regulations 
are mandatory, private standards are not as a matter of course imple-
mented or adopted. A private standard first has to be adopted by or-
ganizations or persons: a food business or organization has to decide to 
strive for compliance with a particular standard or to make compliance 
with the standard mandatory for its trade partners (Havinga 2015b, 29-
33; Henson & Humphrey 2011, 155-156). A private standard that is not 
adopted will not be implemented and therefore remains a dead letter. 
Private food safety standards have been widely adopted in food supply 
chains. The retail-driven standards (BRC, IFS, GlobalG.A.P.) have been 
adopted from the start by the very retailers that initiated the standard. 
Currently major supermarket chains in Western European countries re-
quire from their private brands suppliers certification against one of 
these private standards (Havinga 2015a, 67).15 FSSC22000 has been de-
veloped with the support of multinational food manufacturers. Major 
food corporations such as Cargill, Coca Cola, Danone, Domino Pizza’s, 
Heineken, PepsiCo and Unilever have adopted the FSSC standard.16 A 
survey revealed that more than half of SME food businesses in the EU 
stated they are often or sometimes asked by customers or suppliers to 
comply with private standards.17 At a rough estimate, 50% of all farms 
and 25% of all food manufacturers in the UK belong to a third party as-
surance scheme; as larger firms are more often certified the proportion 
of the market covered is higher (Wright et al. 2013, 52). The purchasing 
power of major supermarkets, food manufacturers and caterers made 
private food safety standards almost mandatory in some markets. The 
result is a quick and broad uptake of private food safety standards in 
the market. 
The adoption of private standards for sustainability or social interests 
reveals a more complicated picture. Some transnational standards 
                                            
15  Ahold, Aldi, Carrefour, COOP, Metro, Tesco. 
16  http://www.fssc22000.com/documents/certified-organizations.xml? lang=en.  
17  Evaluation of the General Food law: SME panel results, p. 10 (http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/food/safety/general_food_law/fitness_check/index_en.htm ).  
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have succeeded in securing considerable uptake and support. An ex-
ample in case is the Marine Stewardship Council standard for sustaina-
ble fishery. Currently more than 250 fisheries are MSC certified in 36 
countries and over 17,000 MSC labelled products are available. Several 
retailers and manufacturers have made commitments to 100% sustain-
able seafood sourcing including MSC certification. Examples include 
Ikea, Iglo, Dutch retailers, Sainsbury and Waitrose (MSC 2015, 2, 32-35).  
Many standards operate on a national or local market only. This ap-
plies to standards for animal welfare. The British RSPCA claims that its 
animal  
 
‘welfare standards have had a significant influence on the animal pro-
duction standards set by many major retailers for their suppliers, and on 
various assurance schemes in the UK and overseas. In some instances, the 
standards have also been used by UK and overseas governments and 
governmental bodies to inform legislation and associated guidance/rec-
ommendations.’18  
 
Supermarkets’ sales in the Netherlands of products certified against the 
‘Beter Leven’ standard of the Netherlands SPCA had a value of more 
than 500 million Euros in 2014.19 The total sales with a sustainable certifi-
cate in Dutch supermarkets amounts to almost two thousand million 
Euro.20 These B2C standards often have to face heated debate about 
the content of the standard and their strategy. The dilemma is which 
strategy to choose: 1) striving for improvement by developing a realistic 
standard and cooperating with commercial parties such as producers 
and retailers and risking the critique that they throw their very principles 
overboard; 2) no compromising for reasons of principle. In the latter 
case there probably will be no private standard or a private standard 
with only a limited number of certificates. An organisation that aims at 
wide diffusion of its standard in most cases will need to compromise. 
The market for kosher products in Europe is small. The market for 
halal products is in some regions more substantial, but so far there are 
many competing private standards for halal food (Kurth & Glasbergen 
2017; Van Waarden & Van Dalen 2015). 
Not only can food business operators adopt a standard, but gov-
ernmental organizations can as well. In some cases, public agencies 
                                            
18  http://science.rspca.org.uk/sciencegroup/farmanimals/standards.  
19  https://beterleven.dierenbescherming.nl/beter-leven; https://beterleven.dieren-
bescherming.nl/fileupload/Rapportage_Raad_van_Advies_BLK _2014_en_2015. 
pdf. 
20  https://beterleven.dierenbescherming.nl/fileupload/Rapportage_Raad_van_ 
Advies_BLK_2014_en_2015.pdf. This is approximately 25% of total sales of meat, fish 
and dairy in supermarkets. Estimation based on figures at http://detailhan-
del.info/index.cfm/branches/levensmiddelenzaken/ supermarkten/.  
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adopt private standards. The Belgian Food Safety Agency adopted 
and implemented a quality system certified ISO 9001 and ISO 17020 
(Raone 2013, 14). However, these ISO standards are not food standards. 
Governments can also adopt a private food standard in their procure-
ment policy, among others. International, national and local govern-
ments can make compliance with particular private standards a pre-
condition for contracting with the government (see e.g. Ten Kate 2014; 
Scottish Fair Trade Forum 2013). Many departments and municipalities 
have done so, such as in the area of fair trade coffee. 
Governments sometimes facilitate or promote the dissemination of 
private food standards within the food industry. They may do so be-
cause governmental legislation is not feasible. First of all, the govern-
ment may lack the authority to prescribe rules. This may be the case in 
regulation that exceeds the legislative jurisdiction (because it seeks to 
govern conduct outside the national borders or is not included in the EU 
legislative mandate). Secondly, governments may facilitate private 
standards because mandatory governmental legislation is not politi-
cally feasible or desirable. Governments may take various measures in 
order to support the adoption of private standards in the market: fund-
ing training programs or promotion campaigns, assisting food busi-
nesses in achieving compliance, publicly voicing support, and adminis-
trative or expert assistance. For example, the Dutch government has 
funded a promotion campaign for EurepGap, and several other na-
tional governments supported and funded MSC certification of national 
fisheries (see also Lockie et al. 2013, 284; Kalfagianni & Andrade Roche 
2017). 
Do governments in their role as public regulator adopt private 
standards? Although public legislators do draw upon or refer to private 
standards, they seldom simply adopt a private standard. A related but 
slightly different form is incorporation of private standards in public reg-
ulation by reference. Public regulators do refer to for example the 
ISO/IEC 17021 standard on Conformity assessment (requirements for 
bodies providing audit and certification of management systems) and 
incorporate them in their regulatory frame. EU Regulations also refer to 
private standards related to analytical reference methods for microbi-
ological food safety (Van der Meulen 2011, 85-86).21 However, in most 
cases in which a government is incorporating private food rules in legis-
lation, the state tends to take over completely. Except for the technical 
testing norms, the government does not oblige food industry to comply 
with substantial private standards without transforming the private es-
tablished rules into public legislation. Examples of this do exist outside 
                                            
21  See Mendelson 2014 for a critical evaluation of the incorporation of private stand-
ards in US federal regulations by reference, focussing on transparency, account-
ability and potential harms. 
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the food sector such as in labour relations. In the Netherlands it is quite 
common that collective labour agreements (the result of negotiations 
between employers and trade unions’ collective bargaining) are de-
clared ‘generally binding’, that is the provisions of the agreement are 
made mandatory for all employers and employees in the industry in-
cluding those that were not represented in the negotiations. The nego-
tiated rules are not changed by the government. However, in food reg-
ulation governmental organizations tend to take over the lead. Exam-
ples are the EU regulation of organic food, the inclusion of HACCP re-
quirements and third party certification in EU law. 
Private standards often do adopt public regulation by including 
general provisions requiring compliance with all applicable legal re-
quirements. For example, the BRC Global Food Standard refers to legal 
(and legality of) products and processes in almost every chapter, ‘in 
compliance with the law in the place of production and in the countries 
where the product(s) is/are intended to be sold.’ (BRC Global Standard 
Food Safety issue 7, 112). Similar provisions are included in other stand-
ards such as GlobalG.A.P. and IFS. However, Lockie concluded that 
compliance with relevant national legislation is expected but not part 
of the audit (Lockie et al. 2013, 279-280). 
2.3  Monitoring and enforcement 
This section deals with monitoring and controls. Do governmental in-
spectors take private certificates into account? And to what extent do 
private auditors check compliance with public rules? And what are the 
subjects of discussion here? 
The current European Union legal framework creates several oppor-
tunities for private food standards and private auditing of food opera-
tors and has contributed to the proliferation of these standards. EU law 
makes food and feed producers primarily responsible for food safety 
and compliance with all requirements (Van der Meulen 2017). This legal 
framework stimulates food businesses to employ internal audits and to 
engage external auditing or consulting firms. Another provision that re-
inforces the use of private food standards is the requirement that every 
food business should have an operational food safety management 
system based on the principles of HACCP. Choosing for third party cer-
tification against a major private food safety standard might help a firm 
to comply with these legal requirements. To be sure, adhering to a pri-
vate food standard is not legally mandatory.  
EU Member States must maintain an effective legal system that re-
quires responsible parties to take affirmative steps to ensure food safety. 
These include conducting food safety inspections with appropriate fre-
quency, without prior notice and on a risk basis, which take into ac-
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count the identified risks, past compliance records, and any other infor-
mation that might signal non-compliance.22 The frequency of these of-
ficial controls should be proportionate to the risk, ‘taking into account 
the results of the checks carried out by feed and food business opera-
tors under HACCP based control programs or quality assurance pro-
grams, where such programs are designed to meet requirements of 
feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules’.23 This ena-
bles public authorities responsible for official controls to ascribe an ex-
plicit role to private food safety control systems. In the Netherlands, the 
Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) has 
recently developed a policy of assessing private systems of food safety 
controls and integrating them in its own enforcement activities. So far, 
it has accepted several national private systems, and, after revision of 
the criteria (in the aftermath of the horsemeat fraud), the NVWA is in the 
process of assessing and reassigning private food quality systems (Ver-
bruggen & Havinga 2015, 2017; McAllister 2012, p. 10-15; Oldfield 
2015).24 In February 2017, the NVWA has found three transnational food 
safety schemes that fulfil these criteria: BRC, IFS and FSSC22000.25 The UK 
Food Standards Agency has listed five assurance schemes to be ap-
plied when planning inspections of primary produce and is also consid-
ering other schemes on the transnational level, including BRC, IFS, 
FSSC22000 and GlobalG.A.P. (Wright et al. 2013). The FSA is reviewing its 
enforcement system and the use of private sector audit data and a 
change of the frequency of audits is being considered.26 
The proliferation of private standards goes hand in hand with the 
establishment and growth of third party certification bodies and of ac-
creditation bodies. Galland distinguishes between two Tripartite Stand-
ard Regimes (standardization, certification, accreditation). The Euro-
pean Union did foster the development of a certification industry by 
obliging some producers to employ third party certification in the con-
text of the ‘New Approach to Technical Harmonisation and Standardi-
sation’ (Galland 2017; Verbruggen & Van Leeuwen 2015). The EU con-
structed a notification system and a list of competent certification bod-
ies. To harmonize practices between the Member States the European 
Commission recommended that notified certification bodies should be 
                                            
22  Article 3(1) Regulation 882/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of com-
pliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules [2004] 
OJ L 191/1. 
23  Recital 13 Regulation 882/2004/EC. 
24  Comparable developments are observed in Canada and the United States. 
25  http://ketenborging.nl/kwaliteitsschemas-en-status/ (1-3-2017). 
26  Regulating our Future program https://www.food.gov.uk/search?keyword=regu-
lating%20our%20future (12-4-2017). 
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accredited by an independent accreditation body and each Member 
State should have one single accreditation body.27 This EU accredita-
tion policy is framed in the context of the free market for non-foods but 
also had an effect on private food standards relying on third party cer-
tification. Because certification bodies tend to be not sector-specific, 
the EU regulations also regulate the certification bodies that verify com-
pliance with food standards. The EU frame means that in the end a pub-
lic organisation (a national accreditation body) checks the quality of 
the organisations that are responsible for assessing conformity with pri-
vate food standards. Accreditation bodies act as carriers and enforcers 
of state rules (Casey 2017). Thus private food standards that rely on the 
process of third party certification for monitoring and enforcing con-
formity with the standard operate within this EU framework.  
Nevertheless, public organisations still do criticize the reliability of 
third party certification. The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product 
Safety Authority concluded in 2004 and 2011 that certification of a food 
operator did not guarantee compliance with legal requirements 
(Havinga & Verbruggen 2017, 202). The Netherlands authority started 
consultations with food standards organizations, certification bodies, 
and the Dutch Accreditation Council aiming at improvement of the 
quality of the certification process. One of the issues of discussion is that 
audit visits are usually announced. Critics such as the Netherlands Food 
and Consumer Product Safety Authority argue that most audit visits 
need to be unannounced to prevent the food operator to clear up be-
fore the audit. Pleas in favour of unannounced visits seem to be suc-
cessful.28 Recently several food safety schemes included unannounced 
visits, though mostly optional and the 2017 edition of GFSI Guidelines 
requires schemes to include the availability of unannounced audits as 
a preferred option.29  
Another issue that has come up in the context of public-private co-
operation is the need for adequate exchange of information between 
private certification bodies and scheme owners on the one hand and 
public food authorities on the other. Public agencies responsible for 
food safety inspections should be notified about non-conformities (and 
other situations) that pose a risk to public health. Moreover, public 
                                            
27  Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance 
relating to the marketing of products. 
28  ‘A new development has been unannounced audits, arriving at the factory at 
8am and entering for the inspection. In the event that access is denied for these 
assessments, the supplier is delisted.’ Jan Kranghand, Regional Director QA MCCI 
Asia, Metro China at the GFSI meeting 2015: www.mygfsi.com/files/Execu-
tive_Summary/GFSC_2015_Executive_Summary_HD.pdf. 
29  GFSI Benchmarking Requirements Guidance document version 7, Part 2: Require-
ments for the management of schemes, 2.5.5 (www.mygfsi.com). 
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agencies should have access to actual and reliable information about 
the certification status of food business operators, the accreditation of 
certification bodies, accumulated information on audit results, and 
changes in the food safety scheme requirements (Verbruggen 2014, 
251). Public agencies should inform private scheme owners and certifi-
cation bodies about actual food safety risks, recalls, new legislative re-
quirements and new scientific knowledge that might be relevant for 
their activities in securing the safety of food. The sharing of information 
is hampered by legal obstacles. Private schemes and auditors operate 
under the contractual condition of professional confidentiality of audit 
information (and the whole system is paid for by the contributions of the 
regulated firms). Public agencies are often not free to share information 
about particular firms either. 
It should be noted that private auditors auditing food business op-
erators that voluntary join a food safety scheme do have other obliga-
tions and responsibilities than public inspectors. A public agency that 
tries to get complete control over private auditors risks a failing regula-
tory collaboration. An example in case is the Dutch attempt to have 
private inspectors of egg producers control legal requirements related 
to eggs within a strict legal framework. The failure of this hybrid govern-
ance structure has been partly contributed to the government that re-
garded the co-regulatory regime as its own instrument (Van der Voort 
2015, 511). More general ‘a bald display of coercive power by the state 
can undermine more normatively based motivations to self-regulate’ 
(Short & Toffel 2010, 386). This would jeopardize one of the key condi-
tions for effective food safety governance (Beuger 2012; Van Wijk & Six 
2014). The value of a strong food safety culture in a company is also 
acknowledged by the GFSI as they started a Technical Working Group 
focused on Food Safety Culture in 2015.30 The ultimate goal of GFSI is 
that governments recognize or adopt GFSI third party certification as 
accepted tools to assist in the prioritization of food safety compliance 
resources and inspection (Havinga & Verbruggen 2017). 
2.4  Evaluation and review 
This section deals with the final regulatory function: evaluation and re-
view of the food standards and schemes. Do private schemes incorpo-
rate criticism from public authorities in reviewing the standard? Are EU 
institutions open to criticism and proposals from private standard organ-
izations? 
Private food safety standards that are recognized by the GFSI all 
have procedures in place for regular revision of the scheme. Schemes 
                                            
30  http://www.mygfsi.com/news-resources/news/444-call-for-participation-in-new-
gfsi-technical-working-group-food-safety-culture.html, accessed 28-4-2016. 
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should be subject to formal internal review annually, the normative doc-
uments should be reissued at least every four years and direct stake-
holders should be involved.31 So far GFSI has shown to be responsive to 
criticism from international and national governmental organisations 
(Havinga & Verbruggen 2017). They have strengthened auditor com-
petence requirements, requirements related to independency of 
scheme owners and certification bodies, requirements for stakeholder 
participation, public availability of relevant documents, the inclusion of 
unannounced inspection visits and food fraud vulnerability assessment 
procedures. GFSI also developed a program to assist food business op-
erators in developing markets and SME to work their way up to certifi-
cation against a GFSI recognized standard. GFSI has announced to 
work on the development of tools to better understand and strengthen 
food safety cultures within companies.32 
The question whether EU institutions seriously consider criticism and 
proposals from private standard organizations requires further investiga-
tion. 
3.  Conclusion 
Private food safety standards and other food standards have gained 
an important position in the European regulatory space. This prolifera-
tion raised concerns with public authorities about the legitimacy, ac-
countability and transparency of these private regulations. Public au-
thorities published guidance documents and formulated criteria for pri-
vate food standards and schemes. In course of time private schemes 
are strengthened: they have adapted to some of the main points of 
criticism and are tightening the requirements and adding new ones. This 
racketing up makes it harder for new food business operators to join the 
club.  
The modern food safety laws in the EU (and the US and Canada) 
focus on prevention and are partly built on the experience of private 
food schemes and food industry. Private governance structures inevita-
bly carry the risk of capture and conflict of interest. Powerful transna-
tional food safety schemes might push domestic public regulators to the 
second row in case they lack financial resources, practical experience 
and the best scientific expertise. For this reason or because of slow-mov-
ing wheels of political decision-making, private food schemes may be 
frontrunners with the risk that some public interests are neglected or that 
                                            
31  GFSI Guidance document, Sixth Edition/Version 6.3/October 2013, p. 63 (2.3.7, 
2.3.8). 
32  GFSI’s Technical Working Group are making headway, 2016-10-26, www.mygfsi. 
com/news-resources/latest-news/575-gfsi-s-technical-working-group-are-mak-
ing-headway.html. 
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the interests of some stakeholders are not sufficiently taken into ac-
count. 
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